‘Scars of war and dying children': challenges of transition to democracy in Angola by Seleti, Yonah
DEMOCRACY
IT W iCiDiNTS
CUUUi l
1 3 - 1 5 JULY 1994
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
HISTORY WORKSHOP
SCARS OF WAR AND DYING CHILDREN'
CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN ANGOLA
Yonah Seleti
History Department
University of Natal
Durban
DEMOCRACY
POPULAR PRECEDENTS PRACTICE
AND CULTURE
13 - 15 JULY 1994
UNIVERSITY OF THE
WTTWATERSRAND
HISTORY WORKSHOP
'SCARS OF WAR AND DYING CHILDREN'
CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN ANGOLA
YN Seleti
History Department
University of Natal
Durban
1At 7 p.m. on Friday 31 May 1991, thousands of Angolans clustered around their
television sets and radios to see and hear the live broadcast from Lisbon of the
signing of a peace treaty between the ruling MPLA and UNITA rebels. As Dos
Santos and Savimbi sealed the end of the protracted civil with a handshake,
impromptu street parties sprang up, motorists begun a city wide procession of
flashing lights and blaring horns, Luanda was steeped in a weekend festivities
characterised by spontaneous expressions of joy. Anita Coulson witnessing the
event put it in this way, 'All through the early hours of Saturday, chants of Dos
Santos, amigo. opovo esta conligo (Dos Santos, friend, the people are with you)
competed with bursts of celebratory gunfire and strains of the all-night 'musical
marathon' that attracted tens of thousands to city's central Kinaxixi square".'
Upon his arrival in Luanda on Saturday, met by the largest turn out seen since
the day the nationalist leader Augastino Neto returned from exile in 1975, Dos
Santos who was caught in the frenzy of the occasion underscored the greatest
challenge that lay ahead in the following words, 'For too long we learned to
make war, now we have to learn how to make peace".2
Although the guest for peace was ushered in amidst daunting challenges,
Angolans were determined to give it a chance. Alas, as we all know, the process
of learning to make peace turned soar and became yet another sad chapter of
human tragedy. Since October 1992 news about Angola has been scanty but
horrific, recounting inhuman experiences, starvation on biblical scale and
hundreds of corpses rotting in the streets of towns besieged by UNITA. As
rightly expressed by Hans-Peter Bakker and Joao Silva on arrival in Menongue
after UNITA 's self-declared ceasefire of October 1993, "It is at the hospital and
the graveyard where the real story of Menongue unfolds. Putrefying smells greet
one even before entering the grimy hospital. As usual it is the children who are
the first to suffer In every room and in every passage of the hospital, children
with all the symptoms of famine and malnutrition whimper softly or simply stare
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2blankly".3 The new UN special representative to Angola, Alioune Blodin Beye,
has estimated that 1,000 people were dying a day from the war and related
diseases and starvation, and described the conflict as the worst current tragedy
surpassing even Somalia, Bosnia and Cambodia.''
Menongue is just one of the many towns where reports of human suffering has
reached untold proportions. The battle for Huambo, Luena, Malange and many
more have left more dead people in two years than in the entire sixteen years of
the civil war. The renewed civil war not only engulfed the whole country, it had
threatened to spill over in neighbouring countries. The human crisis facing
Angola is reported to be far more graver than the situation in Bosnia and yet this
is 'the war the world forgot'.5 Despite the magnitude of human suffering in
Angola the international community has been characterised by a lack of interest,
indifference and paralysis. This indifference and paralysis is best captured by
Paul Taylor's report of a baffling disclaimer of responsibility from a western
diplomat in Luanda;
We didn 't create Savimbi. We may have rented him
for a few years....This is a messy situation but it is
not our fault and there are no quick fixes. This is an
Angolan problem, and only Angolans are going to be
able to solve it.'
It is irrefutable that Angola is a messy situation, however, responsibility for the
collapse of the unstable peace can not solely rest with Angolans as if the rest, of
the world had not played a role in creating the mess. Although it was the
opinion of Margaret Anstee, the first UN special representative and head of
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UNAVEM until May 1993, thai UNITA should lake the responsibility far the
suffering of millions of ordinary Angolans,7 it does not exculpate the
international community. As it will be shown later, the paralysis of the
international community in the face of Savimbi 's intransigence contributed to
setting back the democratic process in that country.
This paper focuses on three themes, the quest for freedom and peace, the ravages
of war and the prospects for a democratic state in Angola. The discussion in this
paper is premised on a view that the democracy debate can only be understood
in historical terms. The historical trajectory that reappraises the inira-African
interactions and the Portuguese-African relations from their advent at shores of
the Congo river provides a background for understanding the plurality and
diversity of the past African experience. The identification of various types of
authoritarianism under formal Portuguese colonial rule in the twentieth century
facilitates an understanding of the character of African resistance, the quest for
peace and democracy in the country.
To appreciate the enormous challenges facing Angolans in their attempted
transition to democracy, historical antecedents that threaten the process are
traced from the outbreak of the liberation wars. Issues such as the failure of
liberation movements to forge broad national coalitions for the purpose of
dislodging colonialism, ethnic rivalries, intra-party enmities, susceptibility to
external influences, foreign entanglement in Angolan issues .predisposition
towards the use of military over political means in solving political differences
are assessed for their probable impact on the transition to democracy.
The historical process culminating in the Bicess Accord of May 1991 that ushered
in the ceasefire and heralded the transition to a democratic dispensation for
Angola is briefly examined. The impact of the renewed conflict in Angola has
been assessed. In the last section of the paper prospects for a durable
democratic state are mirrored against the West's thrust for political reform and
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4their reluctance to liberalise the international economic system. The paper
stresses the point that an economy capable of satisfying and assuring the basic
needs and rights of ordinary Angolans is a conditio sine qua non for a
democratic Angola. The role of international financial institutions and
development aid agencies is appraised for its impact on realising a democratic
and secure Angola.
Contesting Definitions of Democracy
The concern of the paper is to discuss the challenges facing Angola in its
transition to democracy. However, what this paper does not attempt is a
general theorising of democracy as it applies to the African context. It is
important though to note that the representation of the challenges to democratic
change in Angola is based on a particular framework. This parricalur
interpretation does not claim to he the correct or the final one. It is open to
challenges and hence it is hoped that it would provoke further discussions so as
to illuminate our understanding. The paper posits that an examination of the
performance of Angola's transition to democracy should be anchored within the
boundaries they had set for themselves according to their understanding of their
circumstance in the country. It rejects the use of western models as mirrors of
Angolan performance. However, what the paper accepts is the concept of
democracy as an idea which could be shaped or moulded in many forms.
Definitions of democracy have usually been described according to its practice
in the West rather than as a concept, an idea that can be shaped by differing
influences obtaining in varying circumstances. A fixation with the practice of
democracy, and hence the models of democracy, has given rise to a diregard of
the the links between economic and political emancipation. An overly concern
with the examination of arrangements of state-centric institutions in definitions
of democracy, has limited discussions of democracy to the political arena with
a collary argument that sees capitalism as the harbinger of democracy.
This paper is concerned with democracy as an idea which Angolans have chosen
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to explore as a basis for their political life. To borrow from David Held, the idea
of democracy would include the following fundamental values, equality, liberty,
moral development, the common interest, private interests, social utility, the
satisfaction of wants, and efficient decisions.' A quest for these values is a
quest for human emancipation. However, not all struggles for human
emancipation can be reduced to some stereotypes called democracy. National
liberation struggles waged for the emancipation of the people were not
necessarily all democratic though they may have been popular. This paper then
attempts a preliminary discussion of the democratic ideas aspired to by Angolans
as expressed in their constitution. In this regard the paper attempts to come to
terms with attempts to develop these ideas through an examination of the
practices and institutions meant for their implementation and further
development.
As will be demonstrated in this paper, for a society whose experience of political
relations has been characterised by ripples of Portuguese feudal and corporatist
authoritarianism and followed by a rigid one party socialst rule that was steeped
in civil war from the time of its inplanting, the journey towards democracy will
be long and tortuous. The inplanting of a democracy in any country is not an
overnight thing just because it is embedded in the constitution, it is a long
process which requires time. It has taken western societies may years of struggle
between diferent centres of power to get to where they are today. It is
inappropriate to use western models as standards of perfomance of incipient
democracies in Africa. To beg for time in which Africa should experiment with
democracy before it is judged by those standards is not to apologise for its
shortcomings, but rather to take cognisance that the process is dynamic,
developmental, multifaced and complex and should not merely be judged by how
close they approximate western models.
The democracy aspired to by Angolans is expressed in the New Constitution of
May 1991. According to this constitution, "the Popular Republic of Angola is
David Held, Models of Democracy. (Oxford, Polity Press, 1988),3.
6a democratic state by law which accepts as a fundamental principle national
unity, human dignity, the pluralism of expression and organisation of politics,
the respect and guarantee of rights and liberties be they of individuals or any
member of an organised group".' Article three of Chapter one of the new
constitution slates that "sovereignty resides in the people who will exercise it
according to the provisions of the present law. The Angolan people will exercise
political power through universal suffrage periodically for the election of their
representatives through the referred to and other forms of democratic
participation of the citizens in the life of the nation ".'" It should be clear to
every one that the democratic principles espoused in the constitution reflect an
adherence to the generally accepted values as earlier expressed by Held. This
paper focuses on the challenges facing Angolans in the realisation of their form
of democracy.
The Colonial Heritage
In the last five hundred years Angolans have been terrorised by the rapacious
Atlantic slave trade, 'ultra-colonialism ', and the longest and most violent civil
war the African continent has witnessed. Until recently, Angolans have not had
art opportunity to freely participate in the running and protection of their own
interests. The non-participation in the political life of their nation has it
s roots in the colonial heritage, the continuous state of war since the outbreak
of the liberation war, the civil war between the MPLA and UNITA factions and
not the least, the MPLA socialist policies.
The indigenious political system that existed prior to the arrival of the
Portuguese on the shores of the Congo exhibited ernomous structural variety and
diversity. This diversity reflected a medley of societal political thought and
value system. Potholm writing on African politics argued that "the structural
Lei Constitucional e Outras Leis Complementares (Luanda: Republica de
Angola, 1991).
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7variety of African forms reflect certain basic assumptions that Africans made
about the nature of human collectivities, the nature of societal interaction and
the desired relationship between power and authority'." That Angolan society
was characterised by a plurality of political institutions and thought is briefly
illustrated below.
Moving from north to south, we begin with the well known centralised and
unitary Kongo stale through the partially centralised states in the centre to the
segmentary political systems of the Ovambo in the south. Traversing the country
from east to west, we note a mixture of centralised states among the Mbundu to
the partially centralised Chokwe states in close proximity with centralised Lunda
polities. The Kongo kingdom provides scholars with material for examining the
indigenous political pluralism in its natural setting and the subsequent process
of acculturation wrought by the contact with Portuguese mercantilism. The
elaborate systems of legitimation and investitures in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries was a curious blend of the Portuguese and Bakongo value systems. It
may well be argued that had the Bakongo pluralism been allowed to develop
freely in subsequent centuries, the political system would have evolved into a
system capable of regulating and mediating between diverse political interests.
What the Bakongo system of acculturation in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries prove is the fact that given time African political systems could interact
with western systems and produce a mosaic of African political systems capable
of allowing the fulfilment of human emancipation.
Pluralism in Angolan societies was premised firstly on the recognition that they
and others belonged together in this world, hence the acceptance of the
Portuguese as equals in their society. Secondly, they appreciated the importance
of collectaive security. A further examination of the collective security reveal the
recognition of the importance of sharing with others the private and communal
resources such as water, land, forests, grazing or hunting land. Attempts to
monopolise political power or other resources were contested and regulated
". Christian P. Potholm, The Theory and Practice of Politics. (New Jersey,
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8through many mechanism such as emigration, mediation or even going to war. The
third principle of African pluralism in Angola was the belief in leadership. In no
single society was there a belief in the wisdom of one-leader or clan. African
pluralism was not antithetical to democratic values though the basis was not the
individual's rights but the unalienable rights of communities. The undermining of
these values in Angolan societies took place over hundreds of years and is credited
to the advent and meddling of the Portuguese.
The society bequeathed to the MPLA at independence was deeply and deliberately
divided by the Portuguese to maintain the imperial autarky and the interests of
white settlers. The society was divided into privileged whiles, poor white peasant
settlers, mesticos, assimilados and the majority of the Africans derogatorify called
indigenas. Africans' civil liberties and property rights were not guaranteed by any
juridical framework. They were governed directly by Portuguese administrative
authorities where the administrator was the judge, jury, prosecutor, defence counsel
and supervised the execution of his own sentences. Thus in Angola there were those
who were citizens enjoying civil and property rights and others considered to be
"uncivilised' who were treated like beasts of burden."
The Portuguese fostered animosities between the mesticos, assimilados and the
African majority (indegenas) had serious repercussions for the forging of
nationhood. With the departure of the Portuguese from Angola at independence,
the mesticos and assimilados who were the most highly educated staffed government
institutions and this perpetuated the animosities between them and the majority of
Africans. The Alves coup attempt of 1977 was just one manifestation of the strife
between the social groups." The social divisions between the mesticos and the
majority of Africans have continued to bedevil not only the country, as a whole but
the MPLA-PT in particular. In a democratic Angola, class cleavages intertwined
with the racial divides are likely to pose a danger to stability.
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The struggle for Angolan independence is renown for its failure to forge broad
national coalitions for the purpose of removing the colonial rulers. In most African
countries nationalists united in a broad national front to drive out the colonial
dictators. The national alliances were constituted by people divided into different
social classes and ethnic affiliations, some representing antagonistic class interests
but brought together by historical circumstances of foreign rule. Although Angolans
were faced with the same major contradiction of Portuguese rule, the nationalist
movement failed to form a country-wide alliance. It should be pointed out that,
ethnic divergence, ideological differences and military adventurism of some parties
checked the formation of a national alliance against colonialism.
The make up of liberation movements was profoundly affected by ethnicity in
Angola. It is common knowledge that the MPLA sprung up in Luanda and in the
Catete-Dembos areas and hence it based its support on the Mbundu and the urban
based mesticos and assimilados. Holden Roberto's FNLA drew exclusively on tribal
loyalties of the Bakongo in the far north of the country. Jonas Savimbi, disgusted
with the dominance of the Bakongo in FNLA, left and founded his own tribal
movement among the Ovimbundu, the most populous of Angolan ethnic grouping.
During the struggle for independence the three movements pursued their individual
struggles in their areas of operation. This implied that in Angola the ethnic factor
coincided with the geography of the guerrilla war in fragmenting and balkanising
the liberation movement.
The fragmentation and balkanisation of Angola culminated in the liberation
movements failure to create national networks for the broad based mobilisation of
the people for the dismantling of Portuguese rule. Although the MPLA tried to be
broad based, its efforts were restricted to the urban few and the eastern zone, at
no time did any nationalist movement experience a national wide campaign against
Portuguese colonial rule. At the time of independence no movement had
experimented with nation building through the establishment of nation wide political
participation and power sharing. It can thus be argued that the political movements
in Angola were inexperienced in plural politics. The art of tolerance and power
sharing between adversaries was unknown as they continued to operate in their
10
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separate spheres. Clashes between the three liberation movements date back to the
formation of UNITA and they were as common as the encounters with the
Portuguese.14 ' ' '' ••••••• •-.•
The intra-party strife wai compounded bf the fact that the Portuguese authorities
did not allow them to operate in the open) tinder the PotiUguhesiirveillance which
was spearheaded by ihe notorious secret police, PWE, the nationalist movements'
clandestine activities left little room for total mobilisation'of the people for
independence. ' The Portuguese continued refusal to grant''rights of self-
determination to Africans until the collapse of the regime in April 1974"denied
Africans an opportunity to experiment with open politics. The sudden collapse of
Portuguese rule and the hurried transfer of power did hot leave sufficient time to
' experiment with the forging of alliances between political movements. It is clear
that at independence in 1975 Angolans were not prepared for open Arid plural
politics. Their heritage had been to struggle for power militarily and not by
political means: ' >
It is therefore not surprising that the military option for taking power hai hitherto
dominated the Angolan scenario As early as 1961, the year of ike advent of the
liberation war, the use of military means to eliminate rival groups was initiated by
t
Roberto's UPA against the^MPLA In October 1961, UPA (later called FNLA)
troops captured and killed121 MPLA guerrillas." The subsequent course of the
Angolan war was characterised by FNLA's and UNITA's attempts to annihilate the
MPLA. Within a few years of the liberation war the MPLA was under fire from the
USA-backed Zairian leadership of Mobutu, Roberto's FNLA and Savimbi's UNITA.
'When the left-wing army 'officers overthrew the Portuguese government and
committed themselves to the granting of independence to the African colonies, the
only relationship between the liberation movements Was that of battlefield foes. The
attempts to arrange a peaceful transition through the signing of the Alvor
" W. Minter, Operation 'Timber, pages from the Savimbi Dossier (New Jersey:
Africa World Press, 1988),<pp.6-7.
" W. Minter, Operation Timber, pages from Savimbi's Dossier. (New Jersey,
Africa World Press, 1988), pp.7.
Agreement of a government of national unity came to nothing because of the deep-
rooted suspicions and mistrust that had been wrought in the battlefields.
The struggle for the control of Angola which commenced at independence was
characterised by a step by step escalation of violence in which internal conflict
merged with external intervention. The escalation of violence was initiated by the
United Stales grant of $300,000 to FNLA which precipitated a joint FNLA-Zaire
incursion in northern Angola and hence heralding direct external involvement inside
Angola by August 1975. This was followed by the United States' encouragement of
South Africa to support Savimbi so as to stop the communist menace. With the
destruction of FNLA as a military force by the joint MPLA-Cuban reply to the
incursion from the north, UNfTA emerged as the only force that could be put
forward as credible proxy of the United States and South Africa. For 14 years until
they met with resounding defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, South African forces
intervened openly and massively against the Angolan people on behalf of their proxy
force of UNITA, In the sixteen years leading to the signing of the Bicesse Accord,
UNITA had deployed rural terrorism resulting in starvation, 500,000 deaths
between 1980and 1988, displaced over 1.5 million people and made Angola to have
the highest proportion of limbless (40,000 amputees) in the world."
Cuito Cuanavale and Peace Initiative
The defeat of South Africa at Cuito Cuanavale by a joint Cuban-FAPLA (forcas
Armada Popular para libertacao da Angola) army signified a change of balance of
forces in Angola and in the region. The MPLA 's military victory precipitated the
New York Accord of December 1988 that culminated in the independence of Namibia
in 1990. Cuito Cuanavale also provided the necessary impetus for an international
settlement in Angola. It was as a result of the events of Cuito that South African
officials were forced to the negotiating table with the MPLA. Hitherto South Africa
opted for a military option of overthrowing the MPLA government in contrast to the
United States policy of forcing the MPLA to the negotiating table with UNITA. The
W. Minter, Account from angola: UNITA as described bv ex-participants and
foreign Visitors (Amsterdam: African European Institute/A WEPAA, 1990),pp.6.
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failure of the military option in Angola facilitated the ascendance of bureaucrats
over securocrats in determining South African foreign policy.
Other factors that contributed to bringing the MPLA and UNITA to a negotiating
table included internal strife within the MPLA, economic hardships and also the
rapprochement between the two superpowers entangled in the Angolan conflict. It
has to be stressed that the United States and the Soviet Union had pursued a two-
prolonged approach: continued military support for the warring factions and
encouragement of a negotiated end to the civil war. The successful implementation
of the USA brokered Tripartite Agreement of 22 December 1988 bolstered the USA-
Soviet credibility as brokers and guarantors of regional agreements. Although many
initiatives were undertaken by many parties including leading African statesmen,"
it was the mediation of Portugal, the USA and the Soviet Union that broke the
deadlocks in peace talks leading to the signing of the Bicesse Accord of 31 May
1991.
The Transition to Democracy '
The Bicesse Accord of May 1991 ushered in the ceasefire and heralded the advent
of a transition to democratic society. The timetable for the transition was a
compromise between the MPLA three years and UNFTA 's one year period of
preparatiqr^'for the election. Both parties genuinely believed they could win open
elections. Under the Bicesse Accords the initiation of the electoral process was left
with the government of the day. To facilitate political activity the MPLA
government passed a new law of association allowing for the first time the formation
. of political parties. However,'the electoral law rigid requirements of 3,000 signed
up members from at least 14ofthe 18 provinces initially hampered the registration
I of parties until the January 1992 multi-party conference agreed to relenting them.
. UNlTA 'S boycott of the conference and its refusal to recognise the smaller parties
failed to prevent their "participation in the electoral process.
Africa confidential No.30 15 December 1989.
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In the transition period between the signing of the peace agreement and the
elections Angola witnessed a proliferation of political parties, spawned by the new
law of association. By August 1991 Africa Confidential reported 30 political
parties in existence. Most of these emergent political parties were led by former
MPLA members and their programmes were not any different from the MPLA 's. The
majority of the political parties had too narrow a regional base to have any
significant influence. Their hope lay in coming together as a third force providing
an alternative to the two major parties. That the political parties failed to form an
alliance was the making of their own downfall.
It is only fair to indicate that the MPLA government had attempted and succeeded
in implementing most of the provisions of the Bicesse accords. Both UNITA and
MPLA took their places on the peace commissions (such as the Joint Political-
Military Commission, Political Commission, Mixed Verification and Monitoring
Commission and the Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces) to ensure
that the activities and legislation followed the accords. The major problems with
implementing the provisions of the accords lay with delaying the release of political
prisoners and UNfTA 's interference with the freedom of movement of members of
other political parties." (Infringements of a military nature are discussed below).
Although UNITA was prepared to monitor the implementation of the accords they
did not want to be associated with the responsibility for government. The strategy
was to wait for the government to trip over its laces and make political milage out
of it. On the overall, the transition period had gone so well that no parties talked
about boycotting the elections because of serious violation of the peace accord. The
peace agreement of May 1991 held and lasted until the elections.
September 1992 Elections
The election campaign and the elections themselves were a clear demonstration of
Angolans' commitment to democracy as a way of resolving political conflicts.
Campaigning opened de jure in August 1992. During the electoral campaign the
". Africa Confidential Vol.32 No. 17 30 August 1991.
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two major parties took diametrically opposite strategies. The MPLA under
President Dos Santos championed the cause of reconciliation assuring Angolans that
the bitter battles ofCuito Cuanavale, Cunene. Mavinga and many more should be
put behind. The MPLA committed itself to openness and the reconstruction of the
economy. Dos Santos' populist and slick approach broached by his experienced
Brazilian election managers won him support on the day of reckoning.
On the contrary. Savimbi's electoral .chances were damaged by a series of
miscalculations which depicted a failure to switch from authoritarian militarystyle
struggle to open electoral politics." L/NITA waged a vicious, campaign of
vindication and revenge if it won the elections: Fernando Goncalyes had detailed
VNITA 's threats and acts of violence which portrayed the movement as intolerant
and not providing so much a better alternative to the MPLA.20 While Dos Santos
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focused on reconciliation and opening possibilities for a government of national
unity, Savimbi targeted his campaign on empty anti-MPLA and anti-Dos Santos
slogans denouncing any government of national unity. The UNITA strategies of
intimidating its opponents, only served to alienate would-be followers. ' // was
earlier argued that UNITA 's reputation for vicipusness manifested in the planting
of anti-personnel mine.s in the fields of peasants calculated to prevent them from
cultivating their crops and the elimination of .opponents counted on election days.
The elections, supervised by a'UN mission, were judged free and fair by the 800
international observers who had unlimited access to.the. country and to the electoral
process. In fact some of the observers had seen the whole process through from the
passing of the Electoral Act, the registration of voters, the election.days to the
counting of the votes. The electoral process was applauded as one of most
exemplary in Africa despite the extreme logistical difficulties in a society bedeviled
by high illiteracy and deep rooted divisions. The turn out at the more than 5,000
polling stations throughout the country was very high, over 90% of the registered
voters. Within a, day of the final voting the international observeri and the UN
". 'The Rape of the Region", Africa South and East. November, 1992
30
. Fernando Goncalves, "Angolan Elections: Fair and Feared", SAPEM October
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pronounced the elections fair and free.
.. Two days after the elections with the partial results showing MPLA and Dos Santos
leading,, opposition leaders from other parties attempted to persuade Savimbi to
accept the election results. Instead Savimbi retreated to Huambo where he claimed
that the elections had been rigged and threatened that the announcement of the
results would cause his supporters to1 resort to violence. Although he rejected the
concept of a coalition government before the elections, after a sound defeat he
called for a coalition government between the MPLA and UNITA. The swift
dispatch of independent observers and members of other parties to 18 provinces to
investigated fraud allegations came up with the verdict of the elections being "fair
and free". However, from a logistical point of view the number of election UN
monitors was smaller than the polling stations and fraud could happen without
being detected. It is equally true that the UN was not the only organisation with
election monitors in Angola.
The repeatedly delayed announcement of the election results came on 17 October
1992. By this time every Angolan had known that UNITA had obtained 34.10%
while the MPLA had 53.74% of the parliamentary votes. In the presidential
elections results Dos Santos obtained 49.57% a little less than the 50% required by
the electoral Act to win outrightly, Savimbi got 40.07%. Under the electoral Act
there was to be a second round of presidential elections." At the provincial level
UNITA only managed to control four provincial legislative assemblies and the other
14 went to the MPLA. UNITA had been defeated at every level by a margin of more
than ten percent points. It is worth noting that the MPLA had reversed the recent
trend where the incumbent leaders and their political parties had been rejected in
the polls by populations keen to vote out old authoritarian regimes.a
One of the factors contributing to the escalation of the conflict in Angola was the
international community's failure to back the democratically elected MPLA
21
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Angola, Luanda.
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government shortly after the election results'were announced. The; strong arm-
twisting, mediating tactics ofPik Botha, in the country which he helped to wreck,
only compounded the situation. The strategy of calling for a government of national
unity and increased role pf Savimbi in the government even after he had been
defeated only gave UNITA confidence to reject (he elections. A lesson to be drawn
from this experience is (hat the international community should stand steadfastly in
support of democratically elected governments while forcing the losers to accept
defeat.
The worst War in the World of 1993
Savimbi's withdrawal to Huambo in mid October 1992 and the subsequent rejection
of the election results and his appeal to all UNITA armed forces to return to their
units to resume "the battles for restoring (he dignity of the Bantu" signalled the
outbreak of the civil war yet again. According to Chris McGreal, foreign military
observers believed that UNITA started preparing for another war the day the
fighting stopped in 1991.a It is a known fact that UNITA employed delaying
tactics and always postponed the dismantling of its army. UNITA in fact stockpiled
weapons and continued to receive supplies from South Africa and Zaire in direct
contravention of the Bicesse Accords. While handing in dilapidated AK-47s, UNITA
tucked away the multiple rocket-launchers, rocket propelled grenades and
specialised armoured cars. South Africa's involvement drew'protests from
Zimbabwe and Botswana whose air space had been violated by transport planes
from South Africa. It should be said that UNITA used the cover of the ceasefire to
infiltrate the cities it had been unable to penetrate during the war.
The MPLA were least prepared for the outbreak of the war for a number of reasons.
McGreal observed that for the MPLA "large chunks of its forces did not so much
demobilise as disintegrate'.2' The government forces were faced with indiscipline
and low morale and most of them could not wait to get out of the army. The other
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factor is that the new army was barely ready to take up a challenge posed by
disciplined UNITA forces. Admittedly, the government had trained a crack urban
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police force nicknamed by Savimbi as 'ninjas' which was well equipped and could
be effectively used in any urban conflict. In fact the "ninjas" came in handy in
preventing a UNITA military take over in Luanda.
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The civil war that broke out after the elections had been described as the world's
bloodiest conflict, unremitting human suffering with a death loll of one thousand
people a day. Apart from wrecking such human tragedies as forcing people to feed
on rodents and roots, the country has witnessed the worst tribal genocide ever in
the name of getting rid of UNITA's Ovimbundu and Bakongo supporters from MPLA
controlled areas. Stories of UNITA's beheading fugitives running from the war only
aggravates our grief for the innocent civilians. Insecurity has come to permeai the
whole country as a consequence of the renewed conflict.
The balance of forces in the war has been changing. At the beginning UNITA
inflicted heavy loses on the government especially in the battles for the control of
Huambo, Soyo, Cuito and Menongue. Military analyst put UNITAs strength at more
than 35,000 men while the government fighting force was estimated at 20,000
troops by November 1993. The government's fortunes seem to have turned around
with the Troika's (USA, Russia and Portugal) recognition of the Angolan
government to self determination. The diplomatic victory of the MPLA over UNITA
was depicted by the Clinton administration's recognition of the government.
The impact of the diplomatic coup by the MPLA is that UNITA's historical
supporters such as the USA and South Africa have changed sides and they are
providing logistical support to government forces which has tipped the balance of
forces. A combination of factors, including the first ever UN oil embargo on a
political organisation, MPLA's access to western weapons, Russian willingness to
resupply military hardware, Israel's updating of MPLA 's MiG 21s and MiG 23s with
new guidance systems and internal and external political pressure on the South
African government to stop private supplies to UNITA has finally isolated Savimbi
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and tilled the balance of forces in favour of the government." But UNITA 's ability
to sustain the conflict and countenance isolation has not been easy to determine.
The government strategy had been to remobilize an army of 75,000 troops that
would drive UNITA guerrillas away from the cities and back to the bush where it
could remain politically isolated and unable to wage a full scale civil war.% At this
stage of the conflict it appeared as if for the first time a military solution to the
problem was possible. Savimbi has been drawing support from very limited sources
such as Zaire and private or covet government supplies from South Africa. The
change in the fortunes was underlined by UNITA's Secretary General Eugenio
Manuvakola's admission of his forces suffering heavy loses during the government
air offensives that commenced in August 1993.u
Peace Talks and Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement
Margaret Anstee and her successor Malian Alioune Blondin Beye, UN special
representatives in Angola, have worked tirelessly to get the Angolan peace talks
going since the break down of the peace accord in early October 1992. Margaret
Anstee "s efforts to broker peace resulted in the aborted Addis Ababa summit where
UNITA failed to show up and in the May Abidjan peace talks. The peace talks
collapsed over the timing and mechanics of UNITA's withdrawal from the territories
it occupied after the elections. Many analysts agree that UNITA was not ready to
make a deal in May because it was winning the war then. Anstee is of the opinion
that had the UN allowed a symbolic peace keeping force she would have cut a deal
during the peace talks."
". Africa Confidential 27 August 1993.
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South African violations of the Botswanan and Namibian air space by cargo
planes believed to be carrying military equipment for UNITA in defiance of the
UN embargo against the rebels.
". The African News Network report by Paul Taylor of the Washington Post
Foreign Service.
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Following the collapse of the talks, UNIT A. sensing its strength and paralysis of the
international response, took the oil option so as to scare the oil companies into
slopping production and shutting of the government lifeline. In this regard it
succeeded in retaking Soyo and was attempting to forge an alliance with Frente
para Libertacao do Enclave do Cabinda - Forcas Armadas do Cabinda (FLEC-
FAC). As indicated earlier, the MPLA fortunes turned around with its diplomatic
victories that has culminated in a rejuvenated Forcas Armada do Angola (FAA)
capable of inflicting heavy losses on UNITA.
The familiar pattern from UNITA has been to call for an immediate halt to the
fighting and opening negotiations with the government once the war turns against
its forces. On II August 1993 Savimbi called for an immediate halt to the fighting
and the unconditional resumption of peace talks." The government rejected
Savimbi's peace offers insisting on UNITA 's signing of the Abidjan protocol and
abiding by existing peace agreements and UN resolutions. In the meantime the UN
sponsored arms and oil embargo came into being after the 15 September 1993
deadline. With odds working against him in the battlefield and diplomatically
Savimbi made yet another call on 6 October 1993 for peace talks recognising the
outcome of the 1992 election results and the validity of the May Bicesse accords.
This was followed by a unilateral declaration of a ceasefire. In both calls UNITA
had indicated that the accords will have to be 'brought up to date".
As long as UNITA did not offer to withdrawal from the territories it occupies since
the elections there was very little in its offer to entice the MPLA back to the peace
talks. In fact the MPLA had reasons to doubt Savimbi's self-declared ceasefire as
fighting continued to be reported in northern Malange province by 14 October.2"
Although the MPLA had indicated a preference for a peaceful solution to the
problem, the victories over UNITA in late 1993 may have hardened their stance
towards the rebels. There was talk of hardliners taking centre stage in directing
MPLA's policy towards UNITA.
". Namibian 12 August 1993
". 'Starving Angolans now eating rodents" The Natal Mercury Thursday 14
October 1993.
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Both UNITA and the MPLA had hard choices to make in their search for a
settlement. Although the military option appeared attractive if and when Savimbi
could be driven from the occupied towns, it entailed further destruction of the
already dilapidated economy and infrastructure, more deaths and human misery.
From a military point of view a further weakening of UNITA to a point were it could
no longer control towns may appear alluring because it would eliminate a serious
obstacle to reestablishing of peace in the country. This scenario assumed that a
weakened UNITA will engage in peace talks seriously but with reduced bargaining
power than at present. This view would be an accurate reading of UNITA's tactics
over the past years. The danger in this approach is that the rebels may choose to
continue fighting and this will not provide a foundation for building a better
Angola.
In December 1993, the MPLA choice of a process of political accommodation at the
time of its's strength and high moral ground laid a basis for neutralising Savimbi
without continued destruction. There is merit in advocating the creation of a
favourable climate for dialogue by acting in such a way as avoiding UNITA's
international isolation which could create a vacuum and close off all doors on
peace talks. Savimbi is already isolated and offering him an 'honourable'
settlement could secure his cooperation in implementing the peace accords. By
taking up UNITA's recent call for them to come up with proposals that provide
guarantees for its continued existence and participation in a government of national
unity the MPLA government had seized a great opportunity that could return Angola
back on track of implementing its democratic changes. In whichever way peace
returns to Angola a policy of reconciliation will be imperative and a negotiated
settlement provides a better starting point.
The Lusaka talks which commenced in November 1993, almost a year after the
outbreak of renewed conflict .have been tough and difficult. Although much has
been achieved, the frequent breakdowns of the talks has dampened the hopes of a
negotiated settlement that would return Angola to a peaceful and meaningful life.
The talks have broken down on political grounds which had been the last hurdle
with the two sides having already agreed on legal' and military issues.
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Disagreement centres around two issues; the ministries to go to UNITA and the
governorships of provinces. The government proposed the ministries of health,
tourism, commerce and construction materials while UNITA preferred defence,
finance and interior. The other crucial issue where disagreement has emerged is
that of the governorship of the provinces for UNITA. It should be remembered that
UNITA won elections in four out of 18 provinces, namely, Benguela, Bie, Huambo
and Cuando Cubango. The government has offered UNITA the governorship of
Cuando Cubango, Uige and Lunda Sul. However, UNITA wanted Huambo to be
added to its list. The government also offered UNITA the deputy governorships of
Luanda, Cuanza Sul, Benguela, Huila and Bengo. Here again UNITA asked for
Cuanza None instead of Cuanza Sul, Bie in place of Bengo and for the inclusion of
Moxico and Malange." It is worth-noting that in all these UNITA has been raising
the stakes all the time. What is curious is the government's choice of provinces to
give to UNITA. It is evident that the struggle for political control has shifted from
the ballot box to the negotiating table. The prospects of rewarding a loser at the
polls with power not mandated by the people smacks of cheating the electorate and
does not auger well for democracy.
UNITA 's choice of war over a negotiated settlement will further isolate it from the
international community. The implementation of the arms and oil embargo could
be fatal to its continued military existence in a future Angola. An acceptance of the
accords, the election results and withdrawing from the territories it occupies could
still earn Savimbi some living space in Angola. To accept a negotiated settlement
while the movement is strong would help curve out an increased role in the future
political era. It is unlikely that UNITA could obtain a military victory in the
present circumstances. The choices facing UNITA will not give it its much vaunted
dignity. What it will be accorded is humiliation but how that comes about is what
matters for the future of democracy in Angola.
* "UNITA accept posts in new Angola Govt", The Citizen Saturday 19 March
1994.
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Challenges
The major political challenge facing Angolans is that of national building in a
divided country. This is probably the first time in the past 500 years that Angolans
had the opportunity to forge ahead with nation-building. In a democratic Angola
class cleavages intertwined with racial and ethnic divisions are likely to pose a
threat to stability. The continued balkanisation of Angola by the current civil war
perpetuates a process of fragmenting society begun under colonial rule. As we all
know none of the political parties have access to all parts of the country, the task
of opening up the country to all who live in it is mammoth.
The second major political difficulty is the commitment to the use of political means
ofsovling problems within the country. The heritage and norm over the years has
been the resorting to military means. This entails the transformation of the warring
parties from military organisations to political movements. The outbreak of the
second civil war has demonstrated the hazards inherent in this transformation. The
task of transforming UNITA especially into a political movement committed to
peaceful ways of solving political differences is tougher and will be viewed with
susciption. It is important to mention that for the other political parties the
transition has been completed rather successfully. The on and off discussions
being held in Lusaka are a necessary step to diffuse the political problem in Angola,
however, they have set a bad precedent. Losers in the political arena should never
be allowed to browbeat others through the military means until they agree with
them. This is a negation of the process to democracy.
One of the weaknesses of the democratic process in Angola has been to focus on the
reform of state power and the neglect of the restructuring of civil society. Hall
maintains that 'If democratic life involves more than a periodic vote, the locus of
people's acrvities will be the 'private' realm of civil society and the the scope of
their actions will depend largely on the resources they can command'.1' In Angola
the MPLA government had assumed that it could replace civil society by collapsing
the state and civil society into a single movement. As already evidenced during the
". Hall, Modernity and Its Futures. p44.
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1992 elections civil society in Angola is very weak. What then is required is ffor
the state to provide opportunities for people to establish themselves in their
capacities of being citizens. This could take various social movements within the
society, but this has been slow to emerge in Angola for obvious reasons.
Angola requires a cease-fire under the supervision of the UN whose task would be
the confinement and demobilisation, of UNITA and government forces and the
formation of the Angolan Armed Forces. This is a conditio sine qua non for the
creation of conditions enabling the second round of presidential elections to be
held. An effective and well supported role of the UN is therefore essential to the
completion of the transition to democracy in Angola. It is hoped that when the
opportunity come to implement the cease-fire and the peace accords the UN and the
international community will have learned from their mistakes of trying to achieve
peace on the cheap. International meddling in Angolan security matters should also
be brought to an end. In fact angolan security should linked with other countries
to a regional security package in the post-apartheid. The price for democracy does
not come cheap.
A democratic Angola will require a strong economy to shoulder the cost of
reconstruction. In the past one and a half years the Angolan economy has been
battered more than in the sixteen years of the first phase of the civil war. ' With the
war spreading to every corner of the country economic activities have been brought
10 a standstill. Insecurity bled by the war has brought peasant agricultural
activities to a halt. As the diamonds fields in Lunda None have been turned into
battlefields current production of 20,000 carats a month amounts to 50 percent of
normal activity." UNITA's selling of diamonds coupled with the flourishing
parallel market in diamonds are manifestation of the economic turmoil facing
Angola. Over the last months UNITA had taken the strategy of disrupting oil
production and shutting off the government financial lifeline through attacks on oil
installation. The US diplomatic recognition of the MPLA removed any remaining
constraints UNITA had on attacking the oil installations. Fears of UNITA- FLEC
"• West Africa 16 August 1993.
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Renovado alliance and a possibility of a joint campaign caused grave concern in
government circles. Whether UN/TA would lake the war to the oil companies
remains to be seen. Cabinda is one area of Angola said to be well fortified. The
material damage being inflicted on economic installations in diamond and oilfields
will be paid for by the Angolans. In this regard the war is a serious set back to the
process of reconstruction. The task of reconstructing the economy will be tougher
than two years ago when peasants began returning to their homes and life was
beginning to be normalised. So long as the war continues Angola will sink further
into an economic quagmire.
Although a return to peace is a conditio sine quo non for a broader based economic
recovery, the convergence of the MPLA and UNITA views on necessity of a market
economy should improve prospects of success of the reconstruction programme. The
government of national unity will require to correct the equilibria in the balance of
payments. Angola is already implementing the international monetary fund
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The political costs of implementing SAPs
which entails devaluations of currency, worsening of inflationary spiral, limitation
on public expenditures on social programmes such as health and education, and
also the regressive shift in income distribution culminate in the depoliticisation of
the populace and thereby undermining an incipient democracy. Elsewhere in Africa
SAPs have enhanced economic depence on the west and undermined both legitimacy
and political of these states. SAPs involves the state in the reproduction of the
inequalities of every day life. Angolans have reacted violently to the austerity
measures and this certainly is a serious threat to stability.
Angola will be invaded by a swarm of foreign government and non government
development agencies purporting ostensibly to alleviate poverty, to increase
economic output ant ot reduce dependence on foreign nationas. The experience of
Southern African countries such as Lesotho and Zambia is that it gives rise to a
substantial "development aid industry' employing expatriate 'consultant and
exports ' by hundreds and churning out programmes which host contries have little
time to evaluate and implement. The proliferation of development aid agencies in
Angola and their modus operandi could lead to duplication, rivalry and
25
balkanisation of the country which could undermine the capacity of the state to
regulate the economy. The international aid problematic's advocacy of the
disengagemnent of the state from directing economic development will impose an
unregulated reign of foreign private capital which could create unfree and unequal
conditions of political participation of Angolans, antethetical to democracy.
If democracy is seen as a way of containing the powers of the state and of mediating
among competing individuals and collective projects, the same principles should
also be applied to the economic arena. Liberalisation and SAPs should be subject
to mediation among competing interests.
Government intervention in the economy will be necessay in search of mechanism
to prevent the wrecking of the economy by the excesses of international and private
capital. The reconstruction of the economy into one capable of satisfying and
assuring basic needs and rights of Angolans is an essential condition for a stable
democracy and needs to be protected from the unbridled international capital. The
challenge facing Angola is to select an assortment of measures such as selective
protectionism, regulation of foreign enterprises, promotion of exports and joint
ventures between the state and private capital. The state in Angola should continue
to play a leading role in regulating the economy in order to safeguard democracy,
to protect the impoverished civil society from further declines in living standards,
to prevent undue international capital's influence that could erode legitimacy and
self-determination and hence undermine the democratic prospects of the country.
Caught in the middle of all this madness are the Angolans who have known nothing
but anguish for thirty years. According to reports the fighting has left an estimated
two million Angolans as refugees in their own country. The fighting has prevented
a group of UN agencies and private relief agencies from supplying food to the
starving thousands. It took courage from Manuel da Silva, director of UN
humanitarian aid in Angola, to negotiate the resumption of food supplies to cities
such as Cuito where the government claimed residents had eaten human flesh to
survive." While thousands are starving and scores dying from hunger, health
'Bid to get Cuito aid'. The Natal Mercury Tuesday October 19, 1993.
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worker are forced to cut off legs and arms with no medication." Until the second
week in October 1993 UN1TA had denied humanitarian groups safety guarantees to
fly to besieged cities such as Cuito and Menongue. Human suffering for no real
reason except for the greed of a few political lunatics will continue, exacting a
heavy toll on lives of thousands of Angolans who would want to'be left alone. The
world should never allow individuals such as Jonas Savimbi to unleash such human
catastrophe as this. The support of the international community for democracy
should not only be for the successful cases such as Namibia, or Zambia, all those
who profess a faith in a multi-party democracy should put an:end to disruptive
forces.
Angola faces a tough time ahead in all spheres of human endeavour. The
reestablishment of a secure future where individuals will not be allowed by society
to wreck such havoc as we have witnessed should be a priority. As already stated
this will require disarming all the warring parties under the auspices of an effective
UN peace keeping force. The economy will require massive infusion of resources
to resuscitate. At the moment the economy is dominated by barter relations and it
will require the reintroduction of a cash nexus. This is a mammoth task. The
rebuilding of the cities destroyed by the war will cost thousands of dollars. The
IMF structural adjustment programme which the government had begun
implementing before the resumption of the war will impose additional hardships
on a weakened population. The country's strength to rise from the ashes lies in the
people of Angola who have demonstrated their determination to survive the mayhem
that has engulfed the nation. The road to democracy in Angola is hazardous and
fraught with dangers from within and without.
'Now it's 'Apocalypse Cuito' The Star Monday October 18 1993.
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